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The Ottoman Empire’s conquest 
of the Balkans and subsequent 
administration left a perplexing religious 
legacy. The Islamic Ottoman presence 
lasted almost five centuries, yet 
Christianity remained the overwhelming 
religion of choice in the area. The 
Ottoman treatment of subject Christians 
has been long debated, with 
characterizations ranging from a 
cosmopolitan haven of freedom to a 
brutal rule of forced conversion.  
However, the real picture appears far 
more complex than these generalizations 
– the Ottoman relationship with 
Orthodox Christianity in the Balkans 
changed over time, depending in part on 
religious tenets but also largely on the 
realities and varying situations facing the 
Ottoman state over time. A glance at the 
Orthodox Christian church under the 
Ottoman Empire from the early fifteenth 
to mid sixteenth century gives a 
revealing glimpse at some of the 
changing relationships of conquered 
Christians to the state.  
 Accounts of historians from 
various perspectives have viewed the 
Orthodox/Ottoman relationship in vastly 
different lights. Englishman James 
Ludlow’s report on the Janissary system 
in the late fifteenth century gives an 
impression of Islamic religious 
domination. Ludlow emphasizes the 
harshness of Janissary training and the 
strict discipline enforced upon new 
recruits, and gives numerous examples 
as to the slave-like status these men are 
reduced.1 Ogier Busbecq offers a 
different contemporary understanding 
from the mid 16th century. The Holy 
Roman Empire’s ambassador writes in 
glowing terms of the discipline and 
courtesy of the Janissaries. He also 
remarks that Janissary detachments are 
scattered throughout the Empire not only 
to guard against external threats but also 
to protect Christians and Jews from the 
“violence of the mob”.2 The contrast 
between Ogier’s and Ludlow’s reactions 
speaks to dual Western European 
reactions to the empire during the time 
period studied, alternating between fear 
and respect for its successes. As Europe 
advanced and the Ottoman military and 
technological advantage became a thing 
of the past, this strong reaction to the 
Empire and its subject Christians would 
fade to relative silence.3  
Modern historians have offered a 
more detailed look at the Church / State 
relationship. Greek historian G. 
Georgiades Arnakis focused on the 
Church in Constantinople for an article 
published in 1953. Arnakis portrays the 
rights of the Church as legally 
established and binding, but far from 
inviolable in practice.4 He paints a 
                                                 
1  "The Tribute of Children, 1493," July 1998 
[cited 2004].  Available from 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/islam/1493janiss
aries.html., 1. 
2  "The Turkish Letters, 1555-1562," July 1998 
[cited 2004].  Available from 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1555busbe
cq.html., 1. 
3 Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, 
(New York: Modern Library, 2000), xxxiii to 
xxxv. 
4  G. Georgiades Arnakis, "The Greek Church of 
Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire," The 
Journal of Modern History 24, no. 3 (1952): 239. 
  
picture of persecution, citing 
conversions of churches to mosques, 
martyrdom of patriarchs in the mid 
seventeenth century, and characterizes 
Ottoman authorities as valuing 
Christians as little more than a tax base 
to be exploited.5 Arnakis presents the 
relationship as a power struggle, by a 
church “waging a struggle for 
Christianity” against the “islamicization 
and turkification” presumably desired by 
the Ottoman government.6 Overall, 
Arnakis views the continued existence of 
Christianity in Ottoman lands as 
evidence of the triumph of the Orthodox 
Church in an unequal religious struggle. 
 Steven Runciman takes a more 
comprehensive look at the Church under 
Ottoman rule in his book, published in 
1968.  Runciman characterizes the 
“millet” system of semi-autonomous self 
government used by the Ottomans as 
along traditional Islamic lines, and states 
the practice was so well known that it 
was unlikely to have ever been officially 
written down.7 He does find codified 
legal restrictions on Christians, and 
characterizes them as second-class 
citizens.8  He also discusses the 
Church’s ongoing difficulties in 
maintaining urban churches and 
establishing schools thanks to Ottoman 
interference, but he concludes this is as 
much an inherent result of the Ottoman 
conception of the place of subjugated 
peoples rather than any systematic 
persecution9. Runciman finds the 
problems of the Church to be in large 
                                                 
5 Arnakis, 238, 243-248. 
6 Arnakis, 245. 
7  Steven Runciman, The Great Church in 
Captivity: a Study of the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople from the eve of the Turkish 
Conquest to the Greek War of Independence  
(London: Cambridge U.P., 1968), 167, 170. 
8 Runciman, 79. 
9 Runciman, 192, 218. 
part to difficulties in reorienting a 
previously decentralized religious 
organization into an administrative 
successor to the Byzantine state10. The 
Ottoman state exerts substantial pressure 
indirectly (and occasionally directly), 
but Runciman finds Christian difficulties 
stemming from the second-class stature 
typical to subjugated minorities in 
Islamic states. 
 Recent examinations of the 
Balkans have used very different 
approaches to discover a new 
perspective. Braude and Lewis’s 
collection from a 1978 research seminar 
builds on Runciman’s legacy in 
examining the status of Christians at 
particular points in time through various 
articles. They elaborate that Christian 
minority status under Islam was a 
compact between the rulers and ruled – 
it could be used to keep Christians in 
their proper place, but also to prevent 
government abuses. The authors 
characterize the treatment of Christians 
by the authorities as variable depending 
on the circumstances.11 Overall, the 
editors summarize the contributions and 
conclusions on the status of Christians as 
one governed more often by practical 
considerations than strict Islamic law.  
Dennis Hupchick also offers a different 
perspective on the Church-State 
relationship in his 1993 article focusing 
on Bulgarian ethnic awareness.  
Hupchick describes the church as a 
“veritable department” in the Ottoman 
                                                 
10 Runciman, 206-207. 
11 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis eds., 
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The 
Functioning of a Plural Society, (New York: 
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 9.  
Braude remarks that enforcement of restrictions 
depended most on whether the state felt 
threatened. 
  
government.12 He also finds active 
efforts by the Ottomans to assimilate 
Bulgarian lands through resettlement of 
Turks coupled with displacement of 
Bulgarians from towns, though he 
admits the practice was spotty and 
inconsistent.13 Hupchick agrees with 
earlier historians in that Ottoman policy 
changed over time, but his contribution 
to the general debate is his focus on the 
church as a means of enhancing cultural 
and ethnic identity. He concludes that 
the Church promoted Greek Orthodoxy 
over the interests of its various 
constituencies, and that the “millet” 
system drowned out competing cultures 
under Greek ideals. 
 Perhaps the most profitable 
starting point in deciphering the status of 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire is the 
legal and religious traditions regarding 
religious minorities the Ottomans 
inherited from early Islamic law and 
practice. Early Islamic law took care to 
impart a special status to people of 
monotheistic, confessional faiths such as 
Christianity. The Koran’s statement that 
“there is no constraint in religion” was 
generally interpreted as an 
encouragement of tolerance towards 
specific religions, primarily Christians 
and Jews.14 A later passage encouraged 
Muslims to fight against those 
unbelievers, but made a specific 
exception for those who had been given 
“the Book”, who would only be made to 
pay a tax in recognition of their 
“humiliated position”.15 C.E. Bosworth 
describes this as a vision of a contract 
between conquered unbelievers and 
                                                 
12  Dennis P. Hupchick, "Orthodoxy and 
Bulgarian Ethnic Awareness Under Ottoman 
Rule, 1396-1762," Nationalities Papers 21, no. 2 
(1993): 75. 
13 Hupchick, 77. 
14 Braude, 4-5. 
15 Braude, 5. 
Muslims, a confirmation of their subject 
status.16 This sort of pointed legal 
framework is not surprising, given the 
circumstances in which Mohammed 
created Islam. Near Eastern minds had 
always respected the founders of the 
other great monotheistic faiths.17 Even 
Arabia still contained minority 
communities at the time of 
Mohammed’s death, and it offered 
precedents such as treaties made with the 
Christian community of Najrān (who 
promised aid to the Prophet).18 As the 
religious and legal backbone of Islamic 
behavior, the Koran’s tolerance for 
specific religious minorities was a major 
factor in the attitude of Muslims to these 
conquered peoples. 
 The reality of dramatic Islamic 
military successes also served to 
promote a policy of conciliation to 
conquered peoples. The origin of Islamic 
tolerance for the practice of other 
religions seems to stem from the very 
earliest period of Muslim conquest, as 
the numerically inferior Muslim Arabs 
found themselves needing security 
precautions over their new subjects.19  
The contemporary Muslim Balādhurī 
shows a striking example of the reality 
of conquest in the accounts of invasions 
reaching into India. Infidel religions not 
exempted from combat unto death (such 
as Buddhism and especially Hinduism) 
were theoretically supposed to be either 
converted or killed, but this was not the 
case in India. The account reports that, 
while some massacres did occur, for the 
most part conquered Indians were 
accorded the same dhimma minority 
                                                 
16 C.E. Bosworth, “The Concept of Dhimma in 
Early Islam,” in Braude and Lewis, Christians 
and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The 
Functioning of a Plural Society, 41. 
17 Bosworth, 37. 
18 Bosworth, 42. 
19 Braude, 5. 
  
status, as were Christians and Jews, 
acknowledging the superiority of Islam 
and performing other duties for Muslims 
in exchange for religious freedom.  
Bosworth adds that over the years the 
practice of extending dhimma status to 
even polytheistic Hindus became 
normal.20 The dramatically successful 
and speedy Muslim conquests promoted 
policies of religious freedom to 
minorities for practical reasons as well 
as religious. The Ottoman experience 
would incorporate both religious and 
practical aspects of this tradition. 
 The Ottoman dynasty was 
formed at the turn of the fourteenth 
century, and differed in some notable 
respects from earlier Islamic states.  
Emerging Ottoman society brought with 
it a somewhat different worldview from 
established Islamic civilization: the 
Ottoman dynasty was born from hard-
fighting frontier warlords, and this 
frontier identity remained an important 
part of Ottoman consciousness.21  
Anatolia remained an insecure 
battleground, and as late as the fifteenth 
century the dynasty flirted with collapse.  
The insecure birth of the Ottoman 
dynasty, along with its vibrant youth as 
an expanding state, combined to give it a 
different perspective on Christian 
                                                 
20 Bosworth, 43.  This practice was in conformity 
to the attitudes of contemporary religions: 
Bosworth, 37, adds that that few Near Eastern 
empires had sought or achieved religious 
exclusiveness.  Runciman, 77, finds evidence 
that the Sassanid and Persian empires gave 
religious minorities considerable autonomy and 
that it was traditional to group minorities by 
religion. 
21İ. Metin Kunt, “Transformation of Zimmi into 
Askerî”, in Braude and Lewis, Christians and 
Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of 
a Plural Society, 56.  Kunt, 59, relays a 
characterization on the Empire by the renowned  
Halil Inalcik as a dynastic empire with the lone 
goal of furthering its dominion. 
minorities than traditional Islamic states.  
Kunt points out the basic dividing line in 
the emerging Ottoman state as a 
functional distinction between those who 
pay taxes and those who did not - in 
other words, a distinction between 
civilian and military/official.22 He cites 
the fifteenth century Ottoman chronicler 
Asikpasazâde who relates that as certain 
Christian towns were captured, Christian 
soldiers thought trustworthy received 
grants of well-appointed fiefs or were 
placed (along with Muslims) in 
fortresses.23 Inalcik attributes the 
adoption of Christian elites and military 
men into Ottoman service as part of the 
expansionist doctrine of the dynasty, and 
adds that a conciliatory policy towards 
Christians made conquest of Christian 
lands all the easier.24 The expansionist 
character of the Ottoman state allowed 
the pragmatism evident in Islamic policy 
towards conquered Christians to 
predominate over strict Islamic law.  
 Conquest and expansion were not 
the only considerations, however, and 
the Ottoman attitudes towards Christians 
also reflected a desire to expand dynastic 
power and prestige through the Janissary 
corps and the devshirme system. This 
novel Ottoman system involved taking 
captured prisoners and village recruits of 
young boys and molding them into 
Ottoman elite soldiers and 
administrators. Mansel cites Ottoman 
court sources as identifying the main 
motivation for the devshirme as one of 
distrust of rival Turks and a desire to 
centralize dynastic power through using 
officials with no political connections.25  
                                                 
22 Kunt, 58. 
23 Kunt, 59. 
24  Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire; the 
Classical age, 1300-1600 (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1973), 13. 
25  Philip Mansel, Constantinople: City of the 
World's Desire, 1453-1924, First U.S. Edition. 
  
This explanation seems more plausible 
than any religious motive, especially as 
the Ottomans did not crack down on 
Anatolian Christian minorities when 
given an excellent opportunity.26  
Moreover, the inescapable reality was 
that devshirme recruitment violated 
traditional Christian rights, an indication 
that the Ottomans viewed Islamic 
principles as secondary considerations.27   
The creation of this uniquely Ottoman 
system further illustrates that the early 
Ottoman dynasty was fully able to break 
from Islamic traditions when it suited 
dynastic interests. 
The Ottoman conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453 consummated 
the fate of Balkan Christians already 
under Ottoman domination since the mid 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.  
The larger coherent Christian society 
present in the Balkans and the quick 
pace of conquest relative to Anatolia 
combined to leave the Orthodox Church 
well entrenched, and Islam a distinct 
minority.28 After the capture of 
                                                                   
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 18.  
Mansel adds only five out of 48 grand viziers 
since 1453 were ethnically Turkish. 
26 Runciman. 32.  Runciman mentions that while 
the Ottomans allowed absentee bishops to return 
to their sees, most chose not to despite pleas 
from the Patriarch.  This suggests a certain lack 
of government concern early in the dynasty for 
promoting the Islamic faith. 
27 Kunt, 60-61.  The official justification for 
devshirme only arrived around 1500. 
28 Speris Vryonis, Jr., “Religious Change and 
Continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia”, in 
Speris Vryonis Jr., Islam and Cultural Change in 
the Middle Ages: [4. Giorgio Levi Della Vida 
Biennial Conference, May 11-13, 1973, Near 
Eastern Center, Univ. of Calif., Los 
Angeles](Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1975).  Vryonis, 129, 133, 137-8, points 
out that the Balkans possessed self conscious 
Christian cultural entities, and that they had not 
suffered the long period of warfare in Anatolia 
Constantinople and the securance of 
Balkan areas, the Ottomans faced a 
novel challenge in ruling an entire region 
with a majority Christian persuasion. 
 Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II 
attempted to solve this problem through 
lines similar to existing Islamic practice.  
Mehmed extended the so-called millet 
system of internal autonomy to include 
the Orthodox Patriarch as head of self-
government for all Christians, 
responsible for taxation, justice, and 
other matters.29 This decision was not 
necessarily a foregone choice – the 
sultan initially turned to Grand Duke 
Loukas Notaras for political leadership, 
and could have simply left the 
Patriarchate seat vacant.30 The official 
establishment of the Eucemenical 
Patriarchate as head of minority 
Christians was quite a shrewd choice – it 
gave the central government one 
accessible figure to deal with, and served 
to pre-empt possible Roman Catholic 
influence in the Balkans.31 Mehmed’s 
raising of the Patriarchate was 
symbolically powerful, but 
fundamentally built upon established 
Islamic tradition.  
                                                                   
which corresponded to its far higher rate of 
conversion to Islam. 
29 Runciman, 167. 
30 Braude, 77. – Grand Duke Notaras was the 
leading Byzantine civil official in the city.  He 
was executed for disloyalty a few days after its 
fall.  Mansell, 9, Points out the Sultan could have 
left the see vacant, and that his choice was a 
diehard opponent of  the proclaimed Roman 
Catholic union. 
31 Arnakis, 236-7, mentions the convenience of 
nominating the respected but anti-union monk 
Gennadios, and points out the ceremonial 
implication of Ottoman Empire as Byzantine 
successor state.  Union between Rome and 
Constantinople had technically been proclaimed 
in the Council of Florence, but few clergy 
accepted it. 
  
 The empowerment of the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople in 
particular was in large measure a change 
from Byzantine realities. The 
Patriarchate prior to 1453 had always 
been first among equals with other 
egalitarian bishoprics, and had never 
approached the status of the Pope as a 
power broker and arbiter.32 The Church 
was forced to invent secular institutions 
for services previously performed by the 
civil government, resulting in a severe 
strain on its limited resources.33 Despite 
these problems, the Orthodox Church 
inherited increased prestige from its 
official role in self-government.34 The 
fairly cosmopolitan outlook of Sultan 
Mehmed II - who went so far in his love 
of Greek Alexander the Great to 
commission a biography of himself in 
the same format and on the same style 
paper as his copy of Arian’s life of 
Alexander- helped enable the church to 
adapt.35 Mehmed’s concern for creating 
a cosmopolitan capital was a genuine 
offense to some Turks.36 His readiness to 
forcibly deport peoples of all flavors to 
populate it when economic inducements 
failed – Greek Christians, Jews, 
Armenians, and Anatolian Turks – 
                                                 
32 Runciman, 9. 
33 Runciman, 206-7.  Runciman sees this 
requirement as a large factor in the inability of 
the Church to provide tolerable levels of 
education to much of its priesthood.  Education 
and a Judicial system are two examples of 
services now required. 
34 Mansel, 10, identifies a diminishing 
conversion rate to Islam among subject 
Christians after this change. 
35 Mansel, 6.  Inalcik, 89, points out Mehmed 
officially termed himself sovereign of the 
Byzantines (Romans) and Muslims.  Arnakis, 
247, notes that he supervised gifts of cash to the 
church until 1467. 
36 Mansel, 24, reports that for anonymous 
historians writing in simple Turkish, 
Constantinople was a city of “torments and 
distresses”. 
showed his concern for both the 
economic vitality of his cities and 
pluralism within them.37 The new 
responsibilities for the church were thus 
assumed under a ruler at least partially 
friendly, a fact which enabled them to be 
assumed more smoothly. 
The resulting arrangement and its 
legal features are a matter of some 
controversy. Braude’s analysis of the 
term millet commonly used to describe it 
shows that the word, meaning religious 
community, was never applied to 
Christian communities in this timeframe 
but was used solely to describe either 
Islam itself, or the communities of 
prestigious foreign Christians the 
Ottomans wished to woo. The 
arrangement was also probably informal 
and not legally binding.38 The resulting 
agreement did, however, feature an 
                                                 
37 Robert Mantran, “Foreign Merchants and the 
Minorities in Istanbul during the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries”, in Braude and Lewis, 
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The 
Functioning of a Plural Society, 128.  Runciman, 
168, calls co-operation of the Greeks “essential” 
to the Imperial economy, as the Turks were not 
adept at commerce, seamanship, and preferred an 
urban to an agricultural lifestyle.  Heath W. 
Lowry, Studies in Defterology: Ottoman Society 
in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 
(Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1992), 57, agrees that 
the policy of forced deportation reflected not 
only an awareness on Mehmed on the 
importance of trade and commerce, but the care 
with which he introduced missing religious 
groups suggests an interest in developing 
cosmopolitan centers. 
38 Braude, 70, 74, summarizes that the lack of an 
explicit term for internal Christians in such an 
organized beauracracy as the Ottoman suggests 
the absence of an instutionalized policy towards 
Christian.  Runciman, 170, adds that its unlikely 
any new constitution-type document was ever 
written down, as the general provisions of such 
arrangements for religious minorities were well 
known enough already.  Braude, 79, adds a 
search of church archives in 1519 found no legal 
document spelling out its rights. 
  
understood relationship: Christians 
would be taxed more heavily than 
Muslims, were faced with restrictions on 
gaining property, saw lawsuits involving 
Muslims tried in Muslim courts, and had 
the danger of the devshirme involved as 
well.39 Legal contests involving 
Christians and Muslims were further 
tilted in the latter’s direction as 
Christians could not legally give 
testimony, as their failure to recognize 
the true light of Islam was felt to be 
proof of defective morality.40 These 
precepts, while probably not officially 
written down, were understood and 
applicable to the subject Christian 
population. 
 The pressures of rapid Ottoman 
expansion in this period also resulted in 
a surprising tolerance of Christians in 
quasi-official state positions. Christian 
military men who the Ottomans felt 
could be loyal were particular 
beneficiaries during this period of 
overstretched Ottoman resources41.  
Lowry’s analysis of tax receipts for 
newly conquered Greek areas in 1461 
shows that timars (Ottoman fiefs) were 
granted to not only Muslims who had 
assisted in the conquest but also to local 
Christian lords42. Lowry suspects these 
                                                 
39 Runciman, 79.  Runciman, 189, relates that the 
experience of 1520 when Selim I was dissuaded 
from converting all Constantinople’s churches 
when reminded of their quasi legal rights showed 
these precepts could protect Christians also. 
40 Bosworth, 49. 
41  Kunt, 55.  Kunt shows the practice of 
incorporating Christian soldiers persisted as late 
as the mid 1500s. 
42 Lowry, 140-1.  Lowry actually examines the 
region in an around Trebizond, located in 
northern Anatolia.  However, Trebizond was a 
recent conquest (1461), and remained a strong 
center of Orthodox religion and Byzantine 
culture during the preceding Turkish conquest of 
Anatolia.  Its conditions thus approximate the 
Balkan experience fairly well. 
Christian allies were incorporated to 
help subdue the region until normal 
Ottoman administrative practices could 
be put in place.43 Kunt points out that 
while these Christian soldiers often 
converted, it was an individual choice, 
and that some preferred to assert their 
leading place by changing their names 
but retaining their Christian religion.44  
The reality that at least some Christian 
soldiers were incorporated into the 
Ottoman military structure following 
conquest speaks volumes as to the 
relative autonomy and favorable 
conditions for Christianity under this 
period. Mihailovic, a former Christian 
serving with the Sultan’s army in the 
mid 1460s, supports this supposition 
through his praise of Ottoman justice in 
general and in practice.45 The realities of 
such rapid expansion as the empire 
experienced under Mehmed II led to a 
fairly liberal policy towards at least 
                                                 
43 Lowry, 143.   
44 Kunt, 59-60.  Kunt cites the example of two 
timar holding brothers converting while a third 
remained Christian, and an example of a man 
changing his name and being referred to as 
“Kafin Timuntas”, or Timuntas the infidel, 
signifying his retention of his native religion. 
45  Konstanty MichaŽowicz, Memoirs of a 
Janissary (Ann Arbor: Published under the 
auspices of the Joint Committee on Eastern 
Europe, American Council of Learned Societies, 
by the Dept. of Slavic Languages and 
Literatures, University of Michigan, 1975), 29, 
188.  Early in his account the author praises the 
“great justice” of the heathens, and later on 
relates how Christian peasants ordered to provide 
logistical support for the army by following it 
and selling food were always given fair prices.  
The translator has doubts on whether Mihailovic 
personally witnessed some of the material in said 
chapters, but the latter example is one he may 
well have.  If the details cannot be asserted as 
authentic, the general impression of a Christian 
who ends his memoirs with an exhortation for a 
war to liberate Christians is a very favorable one 
as far as Ottoman fairness to minorities goes. 
  
some Christians in recently conquered 
areas. 
 Information on Christian tax 
receipts also shows an interesting pattern 
in terms of Ottoman relaxation of 
restrictions on Christians. Lowry’s 
analysis of receipts in the Balkan district 
of Radifolo (97.5 % Orthodox) shows 
that the average tax rate per Christian 
household increased 31.8% between 
1465 and 1478.46 Lowry notes that in 
1465 Muslim households, and those of 
new converts to Islam, were exempt 
from a major tax (the resm-i cift).  
However, he finds that in 1478 the few 
Muslim families that converted and the 
immigrant Muslim households found 
their exemptions removed and were 
forced to pay the tax, approximating 
their burden to that of Christian 
families.47 This suggests that an active 
economic promotion of Islam was halted 
due to the need for revenue to fund the 
continuing Ottoman campaigns. The 
burden of the devshirme also appears to 
have been borne by prisoners of war 
rather than subject Christians during this 
expansion48 Overall, the problems and 
pressures of conquest likely resulted in a 
                                                 
46 Lowry, 167.  Lowry examines tahrin defters, 
which are taxes due to local landlords.  These 
have inherent limitations in not mentioning taxes 
paid to the sultan; however, they are appropriate 
for a primarily agricultural focus and for 
intertemporal comparisons.  The figures I use 
here are his conversions of the tax rate in 
Ottoman currency (which was devalued) into the 
more stable florin – thus, the effective increase in 
taxes on the buying power of Ottoman subjects. 
47 Lowry, 173-174. 
48 Mihailovic, 157, mentions that the devshirme 
system used captured prisoners of war first and 
avoided taking subject boys if the former haul 
was big enough – while again the evidence that 
he saw such practices first hand is not 
compelling, the fast pace of Ottoman conquest 
would logically reduce the pressure of devshirme 
on subject Balkan Christians. 
relatively pressure free experience for 
Christians and the church. 
 The turn to consolidation by 
successive Ottoman sultans witnessed a 
reversal of some of these trends.  
Trabzon revisited shows that by the 1486 
receipt the local Christian auxiliaries had 
been transferred to Albania in return for 
Janissaries and some other Christian 
timar holders, but by 1515 all the timar 
holders are Muslims and fully half are 
Janissaries, and a typical Ottoman 
pattern of administration emerges.49  
Mihailovic’s claim that the sultan 
garrisons all his fortresses with 
Janissaries or government forces is thus 
belatedly satisfied.50 The fate of 
incorporated Christian auxiliary cavalry 
and of timar holders in Trebizond is 
repeated throughout the newly 
conquered Balkan regions – strong in 
numbers after the conquest, Christian 
military forces have largely disappeared 
by 1515 as the Ottoman government 
finds itself able to absorb its conquests.51  
The consolidation of Ottoman authority, 
evident here to the disadvantage of 
empowered Christians, resulted in 
changes elsewhere as well. 
 The pressure on Christians in the 
capital was reflective of a continuing one 
on Christianity in the cities. Ottoman 
Muslim influence was highly focused in 
urban areas. Out of a Balkan population 
80% Christian and only 19 % Muslim by 
around 1520, 85% of total Muslim 
homes were concentrated in 10 out of 28 
Balkan districts.52 Furthermore, nine of 
the twelve most important urban centers 
in the Balkans had substantially more 
Muslims than Christians already by the 
year 1478, a point which graphically 
                                                 
49 Lowry, 140-143. 
50 Mihailovic, 151, for his comment. 
51 Lowry, 146. 
52 Vryonis, 130-131. 
  
documents that cities were the focal 
centers of Islamic power.53 Case studies 
in Saloniki and Trabzon confirm that the 
Muslim population in each was 
overwhelmingly forced migrants54.  
Focused government efforts to move 
Muslims to Trabzon continued at least 
well into the first half of the sixteenth 
century.55 These findings show a focused 
and ongoing effort by the Ottoman 
government to maintain a particular 
balance in important cities, one featuring 
minority religions but as importantly 
maintaining a Muslim majority.56 The 
impact of this focus manifested itself in 
very different experiences Orthodoxy in 
rural areas as compared to the cities. 
The conversion of churches into 
mosques gives an excellent indication of 
the different experiences in rural and city 
Christian life. Even during the relatively 
cosmopolitan rule of Mehmed II, 
                                                 
53 Vryonis, 132.  The three Christian exceptions 
were Athens (99.5 % Christian), Nicopolos (62.3 
%), and Trikala (41.5 versus 36.3 Muslim).  The 
city of Saloniki was  had a small Muslim margin 
over Christians (25.2 to 20.5), but was unique in 
having a majority Jewish population.  Mansell, 
48, notes that the population of Constantinople 
retained a steady 58/42 Muslim/Christian ratio 
for much of Ottoman history, a feature he 
ascribes to deliberate government policy. 
54 Lowry, 52-54.  These two cities are important 
as former major Byzantine centers, along with 
the capital.   
55 Lowry, 55.  Lowry identifies discrete stages in 
the Muslim repopulation of Trabzon in particular 
(having surrendered, it was a viable, intact, but 
Greek city after its subjugation).  First, free land 
grants were offered to encourage voluntary 
settlement – this attracted some Muslims, but not 
gentry or skilled labor.  Secondly, specific 
individuals were deported for leadership reasons 
and to maintain a social balance.  Third, groups 
of craftsmen were deported. 
56 The importance of this balance can be seen in 
particular attention paid to importing Christians 
to essentially empty Constantinople, and 
Muslims to perfectly healthy but 
overwhelmingly Greek Trabzon.   
numerous Christian churches in 
Constantinople were converted into 
mosques.57 The story of church 
takeovers was similar for most any town 
the Turks settled, excepting only purely 
Christian districts.58 However, churches 
and monasteries in rural areas were left 
largely untouched. Monasteries were 
generally allowed to maintain (with tax 
exemptions) holdings in physical 
proximity to the monastery, while 
absentee holdings were stripped or 
heavily taxed.59 In one case, 13 of 15 
property confiscations in the Trabzon 
and adjoining Macuka valley district 
were from the city itself, while the two 
most important monasteries in the valley 
lost no property.60 Even architectural 
examinations of churches during this 
period find that large churches matching 
the scale of medieval Byzantine 
churches were “inevitably” built away 
from urban areas, while the more 
advanced dome structure was found only 
in rural areas.61 All these findings 
                                                 
57 Arnakis, 245.  Arnakis notes 12 churches 
converted during the lifetime of Patriarch 
Gennadius, who is thought to have died in 1473.  
58 Runciman, 192. 
59 Lowry, 250.  Lowry examines monasteries in 
Mt. Athos and the Matzuoka region near 
Trabzon.  Absentee holdings could be in cities or 
countryside, but monasteries were located 
predominantly in the latter.  Lowry, 241-2, 
further reports that Mt. Athos itself, with its rural 
concentration of 20 monasteries, enjoyed a very 
favorably low tax rate while its varied holdings 
were taxed much more greatly. 
60 Beldiceau, as referenced in Lowry, Studies in 
Defterology: Ottoman Society in the Fifteenth 
and Sixteenth Centuries, 154-7.  Beldiceau 
generalizes that urban monasteries in this 
comparison lost all their properties, while major 
rural ones did not. 
61 Curcic, “The Byzantine Legacy in 
Architecture in the Ottoman Balkans”, in Lowell 
Clucas, The Byzantine legacy in Eastern Europe 
(Boulder; New York: East European 
Monographs; Distributed by Columbia 
University Press, 1988), 61, 67-68.  Curcic, 61, 
  
suggest an Ottoman move against not 
religious buildings in general, but 
specifically ones located in urban areas 
or with particular wealth. These 
conversions are a telling sign of the 
much more trying Christian religious 
experience in Ottoman cities. 
 The significance of these 
policies towards Christian religious 
institutions is great.  Mosques served as 
icons of Imperial legitimacy, and 
converting opulent churches into Muslim 
building proclaimed the power and 
prestige of the dynasty.62  Moreover, 
these actions reinforced the subjugation 
of Christianity to Islam, a focus well 
reflected by the Ottoman mania for 
church bells.63 The erasure of competing 
religious sounds asserted the subjugation 
of other religions to Islam and the 
superiority of Islam over them, as did the 
practice of confiscating high profile 
monastery wealth. While Christian 
religious buildings were allowed to 
remain for the most part, Ottoman 
efforts ensured they would not be 
                                                                   
notes that the vast majority of churches were 
allowed to continue in their original function, but 
that then again the vast majority of these were of 
relatively modest scale.  Curcic, 67-8, also 
suggests that Turkish regulations played a role in 
church construction, noting the proliferation of 
domes after the new Balkan nations declared 
independent.  His evidence suggests opulent 
urban churches were most likely to be converted; 
plain, rural churches least likely. 
62 Howard Crane, “The Ottoman Sultan’s 
Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy”, in 
Irene A. Bierman, Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, and 
Donald Preziosi, The Ottoman City and its Parts 
: Urban Structure and Social Order (New 
Rochelle, N.Y.: A.D. Caratzas, 1991), 173-243, 
offers a look at the importance of mosques to the 
Ottoman dynasty. 
63 Curcic, 68-69.  Curcic classifies Turkish 
reaction against bells as supremely harsh and 
rigorously enforced.  He says the only surviving 
belfries did so because they were converted into 
mosques. 
competitors to of Islamic ones in terms 
of grandeur or opulence, but clearly 
secondary.  
  The status of Ottoman 
Christians changed over time, and would 
continue to change during the 
forthcoming Islamic religious revival, 
but there remains discernable a broad 
view of Christian status in the actions of 
Ottoman authorities in this period.64  
Particular treatment of Christians varied 
according to changing situations in the 
Ottoman state.65 However, the overall 
view of the Orthodox Christian 
relationship vis-à-vis victorious Islam 
remained constant. Christians were 
offered a social contract, but one that 
permanently marked them as second-
class citizens. The Ottoman relationship 
with Christians delineated particular 
limits for them in experiencing their 
faith and limits to their rights as citizens.  
While acceptance of an inoffensive and 
less visible Christianity brought a place 
in Islamic society, and the particular 
details of that place changed over time, 
Ottoman attitudes ensured Orthodox 
Christians’ place in their empire 
remained secondary. 
 
Author’s Note 
  
Turkish occupied names and 
regions are used, except where a source 
cites the Byzantine or Latin name.  
Anatolia comprises modern day Turkey.  
Trabzon is Trebizond, a city in North-
Eastern Anatolia. Saloniki is 
Thessaloniki, a city in the Thrace region 
                                                 
64 See Kunt, 63, for more on the Islamic religious 
revival. 
65 Braude, 438.  Braude points out that Ottoman 
archival sources show an unsurprising trend:  A 
need to reinforce restrictions on Christians was 
apparently felt in times of public distress and 
wartime. 
  
of modern day Greece. Constantinople is 
referred to by the Ottomans and by 
Turks today as Istanbul – I’ve retained 
the Byzantine name because my focus 
lies during its transition from Byzantine 
to Turkish capital. I also refer to the 
author of “Memoirs of a Janissary” in a 
Latin form (as Mihailov) for simplicity’s 
sake. Any references to “Christians” are 
meant to indicate specifically Orthodox 
Christians – Armenians had their own 
patriarchate, and are outside the scope of 
this paper. The Near East refers to the 
modern day Middle East, Iraq, and Iran. 
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